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COMMENT
IDENTITY CRISIS: SEEKING A UNIFIED
APPROACH TO PLAINTIFF STANDING FOR
DATA SECURITY BREACHES OF SENSITIVE
PERSONAL INFORMATION
MILES L. GALBRAITH*
Today, information is largely stored and transmitted electronically,
raising novel concerns about data privacy and security. This data
frequently includes sensitive personally identifiable information that is
vulnerable to theft and exposure through illegal hacking.
A breach of this data leaves victims at a heightened risk of future identity
theft. Victims seeking to recover damages related to emotional distress or
money spent protecting their identities and finances are often denied
Article III standing to pursue a claim against the entity charged with
protecting that data. While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp. recognized standing
even when harm was limited to the increased risk of identity theft, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp. split with
its sister courts and denied standing for data breach victims, citing a lack
of injury-in-fact.
The Reilly court’s application of the standing doctrine creates an
unreasonable barrier for injured plaintiffs to reach the merits of their
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cases. The circuit split should be resolved in favor of conferring standing
for those who suffer a threat of future harm. Data breach plaintiffs’
standing should be recognized, just as the plaintiffs’ standing in “latent
harm” tort law cases is recognized, because the increased risk of future
harm in defective medical device, toxic substance exposure, and
environmental injury cases is logically analogous and applicable to the
increased risk of harm in data breach cases. In addition, the Supreme
Court’s original purpose of the standing doctrine supports acknowledging
that the risk created by a data breach and the resulting expenses to protect
against identity theft constitute a real, present, particularized injury worthy
of justiciability.
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INTRODUCTION
“We have built our future upon a capability that we have not learned
how to protect.”1 These words, spoken by former CIA Director George
Tenet, acknowledge the critical vulnerabilities of information-age
technology on which we rely in modern society. Information in the modern

1. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Understanding Cyberspace is Key To Defending Against
Digital Attacks, WASH . P OST (June 2, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investingations/
understanding-cyberspace-is-key-to-defending-against-digital-attacks/2012/06/02/gJQAsIr19U
_story.html (quoting former CIA Director George Tenet).
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world is increasingly stored and transmitted electronically, rapidly
replacing the methods of the past.2 While electronically storing data comes
with extraordinary environmental and economic advantages,3 its use raises
novel concerns about the privacy and security of digital data.4
Much of the electronic information stored in databases by corporations
and organizations includes sensitive personal information, such as social
security numbers, phone numbers, birthdates, addresses, financial records,
and medical records.5 Electronic data is uniquely vulnerable to theft and
exposure on a catastrophic scale.6 Private electronic data can be exposed
through illegal hacking,7 employee theft,8 the loss of laptops and hard
drives,9 and even through inadvertent exposure on the Internet.10 It is clear
2. See id. (observing that data stored in online networks “is a vital reality that includes
billions of people, computers and machines,” and that “[a]lmost anything that relies on code
and has a link to a network could be a part of cyberspace”); see also Stephen J. Rancourt,
Hacking, Theft, and Corporate Negligence: Making the Case for Mandatory Encryption of
Personal Information, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 183, 184 (2011) (observing that “[a]s the
volume of [digitally stored] data has increased, so have the instances of hacking and
computer theft that result in personal information being exposed”).
3. See PAUL BARBER & BOB WEST, UNISYS, THE “PAPERLESS” BANK—A REALITY,
ADVISORY REPORT: BUILDING AN EFFICIENT WORKFORCE AND A POWERFUL CUSTOMER
EXPERIENCE (2008), available at http://www.unisys.com/unisys/common/download.jsp?d
_id=9000046&backurl=/unisys/ri/pub/bl/detail.jsp&id=9000046 (extolling the increased efficiency
and profitability resulting from the digitization and automation of banking documents); Ned
Madden, Sustainability Software, Part 2: Cutting the Paper Chase, TECH NEWS WORLD
(Dec. 8, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.technewsworld.comstory/68834.html (explaining how
using paperless business processes reduces environmental harm and is economically
efficient).
4. See Abraham Shaw, Data Breach: From Notification To Prevention Using PCI
DSS, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 517, 517–18 (2010) (observing that “[b]ecause private
information is increasingly available over the internet, there is a rising demand for data
breach laws that protect private information”).
5. Carolyn A. Deverich et al., Into the Breach, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2012, at 27 (outlining
the wide variety of personally identifiable data that is stored and transmitted online and
vulnerable to exposure).
6. See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., MDL
No.11md2258, 2012 WL 4849054, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011); see also Liana B. Baker
& Jim Finkle, Sony PlayStation Suffers Massive Data Breach, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/26/us-sony-stoldendata-idUSTRE73P6
WB20110426 (reporting the potential compromise of the confidential account and financial
information of millions of Sony PlayStation, Qriocity, and Sony Online Entertainment
Network users, including unencrypted credit card numbers).
7. See, e.g., In re TD Ameritrade Accountholder Litig., 266 F.R.D. 418, 419 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (denying final approval of the proposed settlement after TD Ameritrade suffered
a security breach that exposed private information of account holders); David Kravets,
Ameritrade Hack Settlement: $2 per Victim, $1.8 Million for Lawyers, WIRED (July 11,
2008, 11:55 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/07/ameritrade-hack/ (explaining
how the data theft “gave hackers access to customer names, phone numbers, e-mail accounts
and home addresses”).
8. See Brian Krebs, Data Theft Common by Departing Employees, WASH. POST (Feb.
26, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/26/AR
2009022601821.html (highlighting the frequency at which former employees stole items
such as business information, customer contact lists, employee records, and financial
information).
9. See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (detailing
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that few entities that use online or electronic databases are impervious to
data loss, given that between eighty to ninety percent of Fortune 500
companies and government agencies have experienced data breaches of
some type.11 Electronic data breaches have become a leading cybersecurity
challenge for the private and public sectors alike.12
With the increased use of digital data storage, the frequency and severity
of breaches of data security are on the rise,13 and correspondingly, litigation
relating to the exposure of personal data has increased.14 Some estimates
put the number of records breached since 2005 at over 600 million.15 A
breach of personally identifying digital information leaves victims at a
heightened risk of future identity theft and misuse of their private

how a laptop containing employee personal data was stolen from a Starbucks store); Jaikumar
Vijayan, BP Employee Loses Laptop Containing Data on 13,000 Oil Spill Claimants,
COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 29, 2011, 8:22 PM), http://www.computerworld.com
/s/article/9215316/BP_employee_loses_laptop_containing_data_on_13_000_oil_spill_
claimants (reporting on an incident where “[t]he personal information of 13,000 individuals
who had filed compensation claims with BP after [the Deepwater Horizon] oil spill may
have been compromised after a laptop containing the data was lost by a BP employee”).
The lost computer contained claimants’ names, social security numbers, addresses, phone
numbers, and birth dates, all stored in unencrypted files. Vijayan, supra.
10. See, e.g., Dori Saltzman, Update: Cruise Line Data Breach Exposes 1,200-Plus
Passengers, CRUISECRITIC (June 26, 2012, 7:30 AM), http://www.cruisecritic.com/news/
news.cfm?ID=4878 (reporting on the accidental exposure of cruise line passengers’ personal
information, such as names, e-mail addresses, and passport numbers, when a spreadsheet
containing the information was unintentionally attached to an e-mail sent to a portion of the
registered members on the online booking service).
11. Security Breach Notification Requirements:
Guidelines and Securities Law
Considerations, JONES DAY LLP (Mar. 2006), http://www.jonesday.com/Security-BreachNotification-Requirements-Guidelines-and-Securities-Law-Considerations-03-21-2006.
12. See, e.g., IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2011 DATA BREACH STATS 1–12 (Feb. 7,
2011), available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_
Stats_Report_2011_20120207.pdf (compiling electronic data breach incidents across
business and financial entities as well as a broad array of government and military
institutions).
13. See Rancourt, supra note 2, at 185 (observing how the increasingly frequent data
breaches have received prominent media coverage, revealing the growing threat to
consumers’ private information); see also Deverich, supra note 5, at 27 (noting that “the
frequency of data security breaches has skyrocketed” over the last several years).
14. Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation—A Tough Road for
Plaintiffs, BOS. B.J., Fall 2011, at 27 (“[Data breaches have] increasingly resulted in
litigation, often brought as a class action on behalf of all of the hundreds, thousands or even
tens of thousands of individuals whose personally identifiable information has been
compromised.”).
15. See Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2005—Present, PRIVACY
RIGHTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (May 12, 2013), https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach (identifying
607,472,154 records breached as a result of 3,679 data breaches that have occurred since
2005). This explosion of data security breaches, and the subsequent increased risk of future
identity theft for exposed consumers, has fueled a growth in the industry of companies that
provide credit-monitoring and identity theft prevention services. See Identity Theft Protection
Services Review, TOPTENREVIEWS, http://identity-theft
-protection-services-review.toptenreviews.com (last visited June 15, 2013) (surveying a
wide array of identity theft prevention services such as LifeLock, Identity Force,
ProtectMyID, and IdentityGuard).
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information.16
Victims whose private information has been exposed or compromised
often bring legal claims despite a lack of actual fraudulent use of their
information.17 Instead, these plaintiffs claim a present injury suffered as a
consequence of an increased risk of harm that may occur in the future.18
These claims are based on the heightened risk of future identity theft, and
the plaintiffs seek to recover damages related to their emotional distress
and aggravation, time and money spent protecting their financial accounts,
and expenses incurred monitoring their credit to ensure against identity
theft.19
Frequently, the victims of data security breaches are denied standing to
pursue a claim.20 Under Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, a
plaintiff must establish that he or she has suffered an injury that is concrete,
and not hypothetical, in order to achieve standing to sue.21 Lower courts
inconsistently interpret Article III standing requirements in data breach
circumstances,22 and plaintiffs frequently fail to establish standing.23
16. See Deverich, supra note 5, at 27–28 (warning that the breach of a person’s
sensitive data results in an “immediate and immeasurable injury” that creates a violation of
personal privacy, a greater risk of identity theft, and a threat to that person’s reputation and
financial security).
17. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability for Risk of Future Identity Theft, 50 A.L.R.
6TH 33, 33 (2009) (discussing different claims plaintiffs bring against companies after their
private information has been exposed).
18. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hannaford Bros., 659 F.3d 151, 155 (1st Cir. 2011) (seeking
damages for emotional distress, time, and energy spent reversing unauthorized charges and
the cost of identity theft insurance, among other things); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499
F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that the plaintiffs’ complaint had not alleged
“completed direct financial loss” resulting from the security breach); Zitter, supra note 17,
at 33 (identifying the potential threat of future identity theft and discussing case law that has
addressed it as a potential injury).
19. See, e.g., Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632 (detailing the alleged losses resulting from a
failure to protect personal confidential information).
20. See Rancourt, supra note 2, at 187 (noting that class action lawsuits are the typical
method of seeking redress, but have had little success and frequently are dismissed for
failure to establish Article III standing).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992) (explaining how over time the Supreme Court has established injury-in-fact as part
of an “irreducible” constitutional minimum of standing).
22. See Deverich, supra note 5, at 28 (“The courts that have addressed the standing
issue are split.”); Zitter, supra note 17, at 33 (observing that some courts recognize standing
based on risk of future identity theft, and other courts deny standing on similar facts).
Compare Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (recognizing
standing for “increased risk of identity theft”), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 689 (9th Cir. 2010), with
Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036, at *1 (D.N.J. 2006)
(declining to recognize standing to bring a claim for risk of future identity theft).
23. See Madden, supra note 14, at 29 (commenting that courts nationwide are reticent
to hear cases where the plaintiff class has not shown “actual, demonstrable” economic
injury). Courts often hold that mere exposure of personal sensitive data does not constitute
injury-in-fact as required to confer standing; instead, plaintiffs must show that the exposed
personal data was exploited and that the victim suffered actual financial loss through theft of
a compromised bank account or other harm. See, e.g., Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon
Corp., No. 08 Civ 6060, 2010 WL 2643307, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (concluding
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The question of standing in data breach cases only recently reached the
federal courts of appeals, with the persistently unsettled nature of this area
of law resulting in a circuit split.24 While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits recognize standing based on the future risk of
harm, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explicitly refused
to confer standing to plaintiffs without more. The Seventh Circuit in
Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp25 broke the lower courts’ trend of
denying standing by recognizing standing for victims of data breaches,
even when the harm was limited only to the increased risk of identity
theft.26 In 2010, the Ninth Circuit in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.27
extended the holding in Pisciotta, also conferring standing for data breach
victims.28 However, most recently in the December 2011 decision in Reilly
v. Ceridian Corp.,29 the Third Circuit addressed the standing requirement
for plaintiffs in data breach cases, denying standing and creating a conflict
with its sister courts in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.30 The Reilly court
held that when plaintiffs fail to allege actual misuse of the compromised
data, they have neither a “concrete and particularized”31 injury, nor a threat
of harm that is “certainly impending,”32 as required by the Supreme Court
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.33 Therefore, the Third Circuit ruled that
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim from accidental loss of back-up computer
tapes containing personal information with no allegations of loss or actual damages);
Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (failing to
confer standing for plaintiffs in a hacking incident where there were no allegations of actual
harm); Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2007)
(dismissing a claim for lack of standing arising from a stolen laptop where no actual harm
was alleged).
24. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying standing and
establishing a conflict with the holdings in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 2395 (2012); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir.
2010) (following the Seventh Circuit and recognizing standing); Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634
(recognizing standing in a case of first impression); see also Glenn Lammi, Federal Circuit
Court Goes Its Own Way on Standing in Data Security Class Action, LEGAL PULSE (Jan. 6,
2012),
http://wlflegalpulse.com/2012/01/06/federal-circuit-court-goes-its-own-way-onstanding-in-data-security-class-action (highlighting the decision in Reilly from the Third Circuit).
25. 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007).
26. See id. at 634 (concurring with the view that “the injury-in-fact requirement can be
satisfied by a threat of future harm”).
27. 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
28. Id. at 1142. The claim in Krottner rested upon an allegation of increased risk of
future identity theft stemming from a laptop stolen from a Starbucks coffee shop containing
the unencrypted names, social security numbers, and addresses of 97,000 employees. Id. at
1140–41. As a matter of first impression for the court, it upheld the notion that when a data
breach plaintiff is at an increased risk of harm by identity theft in the future, the plaintiff has
suffered injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 1143.
29. 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2395 (2012).
30. See id. at 44 (rejecting the notion that the courts in Pisciotta and Krottner discussed
a standing requirement applicable to “generalized data theft situations”).
31. Id. at 41 (quoting Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 290–91 (3d.
Cir. 2005)).
32. Id. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. See id. at 41–42 (establishing minimum justiciability requirements (citing Lujan v.
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the plaintiffs in Reilly did not have standing to sue.34
This Comment argues that Reilly was wrongly decided, misapplied the
law, and reached deeply flawed conclusions. Although Pisciotta merely
hints at a justification for why data breach plaintiffs have standing, and the
support in Krottner is not adequately developed, the holding in these cases
is nonetheless sound.35 The Reilly court raised the low jurisdictional
threshold of standing to unjustifiable heights, creating an unreasonable
barrier for injured plaintiffs to reach the merits of their cases.
This Comment argues that plaintiffs should be conferred standing
because logically-analogous, settled tort law principles apply to the
question of standing in data breach cases. When properly interpreted, the
Supreme Court’s standing doctrine sets a low threshold that does not
preclude conferring standing to plaintiffs who face emotional distress or
credit-monitoring costs as a consequence of an increased risk of identity
theft. The credit-monitoring injunctive relief approved by multiple courts
in settlement proceedings between data breach claimants and data storage
entities suggests that the threat of identity theft is a remediable injury with
concrete available relief.36 Contrary to the court’s analysis in Reilly, a
robust and sound analogy exists in tort cases that confer standing to
plaintiffs on the basis of an increased risk of future harm in defective
medical device, toxic substance exposure, and environmental injury cases.
Under this reasoning, and applying an analysis that interprets the Supreme
Court’s original purpose of the standing doctrine, courts should
acknowledge a cognizable injury arising from the increased risk of identity
theft that is more than simply “conjectural or hypothetical.”37 Cases
involving a data breach of sensitive personal information present a clear
“case or controversy” to be heard at trial; to deny standing to plaintiffs who
suffered due to inadequate data protection is to woefully misapply the
standing doctrine.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992))). The Reilly court ruled that even
expenditures made by victims to monitor credit information did not confer standing, and that
these costs, which were meant to ease the fear of future third-party misuse of victims’
information, did not justify standing because any injury was based on a “speculative chain
of future events [dependent] on hypothetical future criminal acts.” Id. at 46.
34. Id. at 42.
35. Although the Reilly court criticized the reasoning in Pisciotta and Krottner as
“skimpy,” those courts merely acknowledged plaintiff standing without the need for
extended deliberation. Id. at 44.
36. See Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort
Litigation, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 113, 130 (2011) (citing United States v. Janosko, 642
F.3d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 2011)). In Janosko, retired Justice David Souter, sitting by designation,
opined that it was reasonable for a county whose computer system had been hacked,
exposing its employees’ private information, to reimburse expenses spent on a creditmonitoring service. Janosko, 642 F.3d at 42.
37. Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 290–91 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
Lujan, 504 U.S. 555).
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Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the history and
development of jurisprudence relating to data security breaches and
outlines a number of the most severe breaches that are a part of the
dramatic upward trend in recent incidents. This Part also examines the
Supreme Court’s evolving interpretation of standing requirements, reviews
relevant lower court decisions, and explains the results of data breach
litigation at the federal appellate level. Part II develops the analytical
framework suggested in Pisciotta and Krottner and analyzes the Supreme
Court’s line of cases on plaintiff standing, showing that standing should
properly be interpreted as a low bar for access to the courts. Part II
proceeds by drawing parallels in data breach cases with three analogous
areas of tort law—toxic exposures, defective medical devices, and
environmental harm—which permit an increased threat of future harm to
satisfy the Article III standing requirement for injury-in-fact.
In conclusion, this Comment recommends that the circuit split created by
Reilly should be resolved by acknowledging the standing doctrine as a low
barrier to access to the courts, and the analysis used by the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits should be applied to recognize injury-in-fact for plaintiff
standing in data breach cases.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. History and Prevalence of Data Security Breaches
By virtue of the modern trend in electronic commerce and record
keeping, data breaches occur with increasing regularity and practically
anyone is vulnerable to exposure.38 A study conducted by Verizon in
conjunction with the U.S. Secret Service in 2011 concluded that incidents
of reported data breaches continue to reach new highs: reported incidents
from 2010 totaled almost 800, a sharp increase from the 900 breaches
reported in the previous six years combined.39 According to the study,
because companies increasingly rely on technology in their everyday
business, virtually every major industry is now afflicted with data security
breaches.40
Among the worst affected are the financial services,
hospitality, and retail industries, with recent expansion to government
institutions and the healthcare industry.41 The Federal Bureau of
38. Shaw, supra note 4, at 518 n.7 (citing instances of personal information being
compromised in cybersecurity breaches as frequently as every three days).
39. WADE BAKER ET AL., VERIZON RISK TEAM, 2011 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS
REPORT 2 (2011), available at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_
data-breach-investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf.
40. Id. at 13 (illustrating breaches in several industry groups, including manufacturing,
tech services, business services, media, and transportation).
41. See id. (showing the distribution of data breaches across industries). This report
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Investigation (FBI) has also released a study showing that incidences of
cybercrime continue to climb steadily.42
Given the modern technological nature of electronic data storage, the
history of data security breaches spans a relatively short period of time.43
Some of the most notable and severe security breaches in history include
breaches at the TJX Company, exposing 95 million customers’ credit and
debit card account numbers;44 Heartland Payment Systems, exposing 130
million payment card numbers;45 TD Ameritrade, exposing six million files
of customer contact information;46 The Gap retail store, exposing private
information of 800,000 job applicants;47 and CitiGroup, exposing 210,000
customers’ accounts.48 The largest-ever reported breach occurred at Sony,
where a breach revealed 144 million customers’ confidential account data
and credit and debit card numbers.49 This trend has produced a burgeoning
area of law that only promises to grow and evolve in coming years as an
increasing volume of cybersecurity cases are litigated.
In light of the increasing threat to Americans concerning personal data
loss and identity theft resulting from electronic security breaches,
Congress—as well as numerous state legislatures—has taken action to
implement a range of laws to remedy the growing problem. Some of these
laws are designed to deter the crime of identity theft generally.50 Other
observed that a change is underway, and that unlike in previous years in which ninety
percent or more of records lost were derived from financial services targets, there is a trend
to a more even distribution, presenting an expanded threat to other industries. Id.
42. See INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., 2011 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 14 (2011),
available at http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2011_IC3Report.pdf (revealing an
increase in reported cybercrimes from 16,838 in 2000 to 315,246 in 2011); see also Siobhan
Gorman & Evan Perez, FBI Probes Hack at Citibank, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2009, at A1.
43. See Chronology of Data Breaches, supra note 15 (compiling a list of data breach
incidents since 2005).
44. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Scope of TJX Data Breach Doubles: 94M Cards Now Said To Be
Affected, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 24, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s
/article/9043944/Scope_of_TJX_data_breach_doubles_94M_cards_now_said_to_be_affecte
d (explaining that the revelation of the doubling of the previously believed number makes
this among the largest exposures of credit card numbers in history).
45. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nelson D. Schwartz, MasterCard and Visa
Investigate Data Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/31/
business/mastercard-and-visa-look-into-possible-attack.html (reporting that the
sophistication of hacking attacks on electronic financial data is increasing).
46. Sharon Gaudin, Hacker Gained Access to Data on Millions of TD Ameritrade
(Sept.
14,
2007,
1:46
PM),
Customers,
INFORMATIONWEEK
http://www.informationweek.com/news/20
1806604.
47. Sharon Gaudin, Theft of Gap Laptop Puts 800,000 Job Applicants at Risk,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 1, 2007, 1:21 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/20
2103785.
48. Andy Greenberg, Citibank Reveals One Percent of Credit Card Accounts Exposed in
Hacker Intrusion, FORBES (June 9, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andy
greenberg/2011/06/09/citibank-reveals-one-percent-of-all-accounts-exposed-in-hack.
49. Deverich, supra note 5, at 27.
50. See, e.g., The Identity Theft Protection Act of 2000: Hearing on H.R. 4311
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laws require notification and public disclosure of data security breaches
involving personal information.51 While broader data security proposals
have been introduced in Congress, federal legislators have largely allowed
these bills to languish and have thus far failed to enact comprehensive data
security legislation.52
While the enactment of state and federal legislation represents positive
initial steps toward protecting against data breaches and identity theft, more
comprehensive federal legislation is necessary to protect consumers from
cybersecurity threats. Given the inconsistency of courts’ willingness to
recognize the increased risk of identity theft that data breaches pose,
plaintiffs have faced an uphill battle finding relief through civil ligation.53
Unless courts are successful in reducing the risk of loss to consumers by
recognizing the costs associated with data loss and credit monitoring as
sufficient to support standing, statutory means may be the only route to
protect consumers by creating a statutory cause of action for victims. A
move in this direction has already begun on the state level, as Hawaii
considered a bill in 2011 that would authorize any person to sue who is a
victim of a data security breach that creates a risk of harm by identity
theft.54
However, as the state and federal law currently stands, these measures
fall short of helping individuals who have been affected by a failure of data
security and resulting identity theft.55 Resolving the split among the Third,
Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 106–13 (2000) (statement of
Betsy Broder, Assistant Director for the Division of Planning and Information of the
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission) (describing the Identity
Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act’s purpose of aiding law enforcement and
preventing identity theft before it occurs). In 1998 Congress enacted the Identity Theft
and Assumption Deterrence Act, making identity theft a federal crime. See Pub. L. No.
105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006)).
51. In 2002, California was among the first states to enact a data breach security law,
passing S.B. 1386, the first legislation requiring entities to notify an individual of any
unauthorized acquisition of the individual’s personal information. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§
1798.29, 1798.80–.84 (West 2009). Today forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands have all enacted legislation requiring notification of security
breaches involving personal information. See State Security Breach Notification Laws,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/securitybreach-notification-laws.aspx (last updated Aug. 20, 2012) (reporting that the only states
that have not yet enacted data security breach legislation are Alabama, Kentucky, New
Mexico, and South Dakota).
52. See Julie A. Heitzenrater, Note, Data Breach Notification Legislation: Recent
Developments, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 661, 662–63 (2008) (asserting that
Congress has failed to pass any unifying data breach legislation, leaving a “patchwork of
state laws”).
53. See Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation—A Tough Road for
Plaintiffs, BOS. B.J., Fall 2011, at 27, 27–28 (explaining the reluctance of courts to allow
data breach cases to proceed past the earliest stages of litigation).
54. S.B. 728, 26th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2011).
55. See Rancourt, supra note 2, at 201–05 (discussing the inadequacies of current
federal cybersecurity legislation).
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Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in favor of permitting standing will best serve
the interests of consumers by deterring risky data storage practices and
minimizing the risk of greater economic loss as a result of identity theft.56
B. Article III Standing Requirements and Injury-in-Fact
Although the Constitution does not explicitly describe the standing
doctrine, the Supreme Court has interpreted Article III’s case-orcontroversy requirement as a requirement for the plaintiff to prove
standing.57 For a federal court to exert jurisdiction over a particular case,
one plaintiff must prove standing for the relief that the plaintiff seeks.58 If
a plaintiff fails to meet this requirement, the federal court must dismiss a
case without deciding the merits.59
Under Article III, section 2 of the Constitution, federal judicial power is
limited to resolution of “cases” and “controversies.”60 This standing
requirement is one of the Court’s several justiciability doctrines, which also
include ripeness, mootness, political questions, and abstention.61 The
requirements of the standing doctrine are: (1) the plaintiff must have
suffered injury-in-fact; (2) the plaintiff’s injury must be fairly traceable to
the actions of the defendant; and (3) the relief requested in the suit must
redress the plaintiff’s injury.62 In addition to requirements of causation and
redressability, which are not explored in detail here, a plaintiff must show
“injury-in-fact,” which is central to the discussion of data breach standing
and is defined as “invasion of a legally protected interest.”63 This injury
must be “concrete and particularized,” “actual or imminent,” and not
“conjectural or hypothetical.”64 This limitation on the power of the federal

56. See Shaw, supra note 4, at 562 (suggesting that the adoption of comprehensive
cybersecurity legislation will protect consumers by increasing the risk of liability for data
storing companies and reducing the overall number of data breaches).
57. Bradford Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to
Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665, 673 (2009) (noting that at least since Stark was decided,
the Supreme Court has required Article III standing); see also Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288, 310 (1944) (stating for the first time the Article III standing requirements).
58. Mank, supra note 57, at 673.
59. Id.
60. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
61. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 2.3, at
49–50 (4th ed. 2011) (outlining the several principles of justiciability that limit federal
judicial power); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (explaining that these
doctrines reflect a concern about how to limit the role that courts have in a democratic
society).
62. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (reviewing the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence).
See generally Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008)
(discussing the essential elements of the Article III standing requirements and their relative
functions).
63. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that the plaintiff
lacked standing to challenge environmental regulations).
64. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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judiciary is fundamental to maintaining the appropriate separation of
powers.65
Because the term “standing” embodies both constitutional requirements
and prudential considerations,66 it is not always clear in Supreme Court
opinions whether Article III requires particular features of the standing
doctrine or whether the Court itself has adopted these requirements.67
Despite this uncertainty, the Supreme Court has established that at an
“irreducible minimum,”68 Article III standing requires that the party who
seeks the court’s action must “show that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant.”69
Injury-in-fact has been defined expansively to include injuries even to
spiritual and aesthetic interests, in addition to mere economic and physical
interests.70 A plaintiff must also show that this factual injury is fairly
traceable to the actions of the defendant,71 and that it will likely be
“redressed by a favorable decision.”72 The Supreme Court has applied the
standing doctrine to serve several separation-of-powers functions for the
courts, including hearing only cases with sufficient adversity capable of
judicial resolution,73 avoiding political questions better left to the political
branches, and limiting use of citizen suits.74
One scholar notes that the standing doctrine is “notoriously difficult” to
interpret and apply, observing that “lower courts resolving standing
questions have produced contradictory results: cases with essentially the
same facts come out in wildly different ways” and that “[s]uch
unpredictability has generated extensive controversy.”75 With a lack of
65. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (asserting that Article III standing is built on “a single
basic idea—the idea of separation of powers”). See generally F. Andrew Hessick,
Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 56–65 (2012) (discussing the origins of
Article III standing).
66. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (explaining that the inquiry made in
a standing analysis includes both constitutional and prudential limitations).
67. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92–93 (1968) (articulating the confusion that
developed in light of the Court’s decision in Frothingham v. Mellon, 288 F. 252 (D.C. Cir.
1923), over whether the Court’s holding was compelled by the Constitution).
68. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (delineating the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the limitations
on judicial power).
69. Id. (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
70. Hessick, supra note 65, at 57 (noting the broad bounds of how injury is defined).
71. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (delineating the causal
connection requirement).
72. Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
73. See Elliott, supra note 62, at 510–11 (arguing that the complexity of current
doctrine is not needed to ensure that cases are “concretely adverse”).
74. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974) (determining justiciability on
the basis of sufficient adversity); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 445–46, 458–59 (1939)
(discussing the nonjusticiability of political questions and citizen suits).
75. See Elliott, supra note 62, at 466.
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clear definitions to guide the application of the standing doctrine, courts
often erroneously apply the doctrine as a decision on the merits under the
pretense of a jurisdictional inquiry.76
Several leading cases, particularly Whitmore v. Arkansas,77 Lujan, and
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,78 serve to delineate the modern Court’s
interpretation of Article III standing requirements and are frequently cited
by the lower courts. In Whitmore, the Court addressed the question of
whether one death row inmate may bring a suit on behalf of another, ruling
that the inmate lacked standing for failure to show injury-in-fact.79 The
Court held that that injury must be concrete in “both a qualitative and
temporal sense.”80 The complainant must allege an injury to himself that is
“distinct and palpable,” as opposed to merely “[a]bstract.”81 Importantly,
the Court in Whitmore noted that the “threshold inquiry into standing ‘in no
way depends on the merits of the [plaintiff’s claim].’”82
Building on Whitmore, the Court in Lujan found that members of
environmental groups who asserted injury due to lack of opportunity to
observe endangered species did not show an injury which would be
redressable as a result of their suit challenging a regulation of the Secretary
of the Interior.83 Not only did the Court hold that the groups did not make
a claim of a harm that was redressable, the Court further held that the
damage to a species as a product of government action did not suffice as an
imminent harm to the plaintiffs that was sufficient for standing.84 While
this case dealt with standing in a challenge to government action—a
context which is applicable to the original separation of powers purpose of
the Article III standing requirement—courts erroneously use Lujan as a
standard for measuring standing in a range of factual scenarios which do
not serve the intent of the doctrine.85 In Lyons, a case brought by a plaintiff
who feared a future harm by the police force in Los Angeles, the Court
again denied standing, emphasizing that cases will be dismissed in
76. See id. (citing Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for
Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663 (1977)) (noting various criticisms to the
standing doctrine).
77. 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
78. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
79. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 156.
80. Id. at 155.
81. Id. (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)).
82. Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
83. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570–71 (1992) (declining to find
a redressable injury where endangered species were threatened by projects in foreign
countries partially funded by the Agency for International Development).
84. See id. at 564 (finding that past activity and future, but unplanned, intent were
insufficient to constitute an injury).
85. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983) (observing that
emotional trauma is relevant in determining standing but insufficient to constitute the basis
for standing).
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circumstances where the alleged future harm is not “real and immediate.”86
In a line of recent cases, however, the Court has expanded plaintiffs’
ability to reach the merits of their cases in situations involving emotional
distress and a heightened risk of injury or fear. Among the most notable
was the Supreme Court case Doe v. Chao,87 in which the plaintiff sued the
Department of Labor after it exposed his social security number beyond the
limits of the Privacy Act.88 The plaintiff alleged that he suffered emotional
distress as a result of the exposure of his private information.89 The Court
applied a seemingly lower bar than in Lujan, acknowledging that a plaintiff
who was “torn . . . all to pieces” and was “greatly concerned and worried
because” of the potentially “devastating consequences”90 of the exposure of
his social security number had no cause of action under the Privacy Act,
but nonetheless had standing under Article III.91
Lower courts have followed the Chao Court, conferring standing for
plaintiffs who have suffered an increased risk of harm by the actions of the
defendant. For example, in Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG,92 the court
observed, “injury-in-fact may simply be the fear or anxiety of future
harm.”93 The Denney court further observed that the risk of future harm
might also involve “economic costs, such as medical monitoring and
preventative steps; but aesthetic, emotional or psychological harms also
suffice for standing purposes.”94 Cases like Denney reflect a broadening of
the Article III standing requirement to include emotional distress and
anxiety.95
C. Lower Court Decisions and the Initial Trend Toward Denying
Standing in Data Breach Cases
A survey of district court rulings in data breach cases reveals a history of
inconsistent outcomes, but most courts support the conclusion that
plaintiffs whose data has been breached, but not yet misused, have not
suffered sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy the standing requirements under
86. Id. at 110.
87. 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
88. Id. at 617.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 624–25 (majority opinion) (“[A]n individual subjected to an adverse
effect has injury enough to open the courthouse door, but without more has no cause of
action for damages under the Privacy Act.”).
92. 443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006).
93. Id. at 264.
94. Id. at 265.
95. See, e.g., McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-00944, 2009 WL
2843269, at *2–4 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009) (deciding that the plaintiffs had standing “where
the plaintiffs’ personal information [wa]s missing, ha[d] not yet been misused, but where the
plaintiffs fear[ed] that it w[ould] be used improperly and to their financial detriment”).
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Article III.
In Giordano v. Wachovia Securities, LLC,96 a bank customer opened a
retirement account, providing the bank with her name, address, and social
security number.97 This data was later printed out as part of a report
containing financial information about tens of thousands of customers, and
was subsequently lost.98 Because the customer did not suffer any actual or
attempted identity theft, the court in Giordano held that the customer
lacked standing to bring a claim on the basis of a risk of future identity
theft.99 The court determined that the customer lacked constitutional
standing because she had failed to show that she suffered an injury-in-fact
that was either “actual or imminent.”100 The court reasoned that the
customer’s allegations that, as a result of the corporation’s actions, she
would incur the costs of obtaining credit-monitoring services to prevent
identity theft simply did not rise to the level of creating a concrete and
particularized injury because such claims, at most, were speculative and
involved merely hypothetical future injuries.101
The case Bell v. Acxiom Corp.102 involved a corporation that specialized
in storing personal and financial data for its corporate clients, whose
computer database was compromised and client files were exposed.103 A
client filed a class action suit seeking damages and injunctive relief
alleging that the security failure violated her privacy and left her at a risk of
receiving junk mail and falling victim to identity theft.104 The court granted
a motion to dismiss, finding that the claim was not justiciable for lack of
standing.105 The court pointed out that “[a]ssertions of potential future
injury” do not qualify as injury-in-fact, and a threatened injury must be
certainly impending to constitute injury-in-fact.106 The court added that
while there had been numerous lawsuits alleging an increased risk of
identity theft, no court had considered mere risk to be damage, and that
only when the plaintiff had actually been the victim of identity theft had the
courts found that there were cognizable injury and damages.107
The court in Key v. DSW Inc.108 similarly held that a customer whose
96. No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006).
97. Id. at *1.
98. See id. (noting that the report was lost in transit after being mailed with UPS).
99. See id. at *4 (reiterating that “[a] complaint alleging the mere potential for an injury
does not satisfy Plaintiff’s burden to prove standing”).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. No. 4:06cv00485, 2006 WL 2850042 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006).
103. Id. at *1.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *2–3.
106. Id. at *2.
107. Id.
108. 454 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2006).

GALBRAITH.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1380

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/3/2013 10:53 AM

[Vol. 62:1365

personal information had been compromised did not have standing to sue
for future damages on the basis of an increased risk of identity theft.109 The
court observed that many jurisdictions embrace the rule that an alleged
increase in risk of future injury cannot be considered an “actual or
imminent” injury.110 Thus, these courts have denied standing, or granted
summary judgment for failure to establish damages, in negligence and
breach of confidentiality claims brought in response to unlawful third-party
access to secure data from a financial institution.111 The court also noted
that a lack of answers to the simple questions concerning who would cause
harm to the customer, when it could occur, and how extensive the injury
would be, illustrated the “indefinite and speculative” nature of the
plaintiff’s alleged injury.112 In sum, the court reiterated that the customer’s
claims were based on little more than speculation that she would be the
victim of wrongdoing at an unidentified point in the future.113
While these cases represent a larger trend toward denying standing
among the lower courts, other courts have acknowledged standing,
especially in the years since the 2007 Pisciotta decision in the Seventh
Circuit.114
D. The New Circuit Split
The circuit courts have only recently begun to rule on the question of
standing in data breach cases. The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of
standing in a data breach case as a matter of first impression in 2007,115
followed by the Ninth Circuit in 2010116 and the Third Circuit in 2011.117
Reflecting the unsettled nature of cybersecurity law and the diverging
outcomes in the lower courts, the issue of standing in data security breaches
at the appellate level resulted in a circuit split.
The Seventh Circuit in Pisciotta rejected the trend of lower courts and
charted a new course by recognizing standing for victims of data breaches,
even when the plaintiffs’ injuries were limited merely to the increased risk
109. See id. at 685 (holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because she failed to
demonstrate that she suffered an injury-in-fact).
110. Id. at 689.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 690.
113. Id.
114. See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051 (E.D. Mo. 2009)
(noting that subsequent to Pisciotta, district courts have “consistently” upheld standing for
increased risk of identity theft).
115. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634–35, 637 (7th Cir. 2007)
(upholding the plaintiffs’ claim as justiciable but finding that credit-monitoring costs were
non-compensable damages in what was a “novel question of state law”).
116. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
117. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2395
(2012).
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of identity theft.118 The plaintiffs in Pisciotta brought a class action suit
against a bank that failed to adequately secure the plaintiffs’ online
financial information, which was compromised when a third-party hacker
gained access to the bank’s database.119 The Pisciotta court proposed an
alternative analysis, referencing in footnotes several areas of tort law that
support the notion that conferring standing should be appropriate for this
class of plaintiffs.120
The Pisciotta ruling marked a turning point, where lower courts began
increasingly to recognize standing for data breach victims. In McLoughlin
v. People’s United Bank, Inc.,121 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut ruled that plaintiffs had standing to sue where a bank lost up to
ten unencrypted tapes with names, social security numbers, and bank
account information.122 The court found that the plaintiffs’ mere fear of
harm in the future was sufficient for standing and noted that the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit standard for an injury-in-fact consists of
as little as “simply . . . the fear or anxiety of future harm.”123 Likewise, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Caudle v.
Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc.124 found that an employee alleged
adequate injury-in-fact for standing purposes when a laptop containing his
personal information was stolen from his employer, but the court found that
the employee could not sustain a claim under New York law for negligence
or breach of fiduciary duty.125 Although the lower court decisions show the
weight of the authority largely on the side of denying standing, a minority
of courts have begun to recognize standing, mostly in the wake of
Pisciotta.126
A few years later, the Ninth Circuit in Krottner adopted and expanded
the logic used in Pisciotta, finding that an act that harms the plaintiff only
by increasing the risk of future harm to the plaintiff is enough to confer
standing.127 The claim in Krottner was based upon an allegation of
118. See Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634 (rejecting the notion that courts do not have subject
matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs whose data has been compromised, but not yet
misused, have not suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing).
119. Id. at 631 (detailing the plaintiff’s allegations).
120. Id. at 634 nn.3–4 (analogizing to an exposure to a toxic substances case and a
defective medical equipment case).
121. No. 3:08-cv-00944, 2009 WL 2843269 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009).
122. See id. at *1, *4 (concluding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction based on
a standing analysis).
123. Id. at *4.
124. 580 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
125. Id. at 276, 280, 282–83.
126. Deverich, supra note 5, at 28 (observing that since the ruling in Pisciotta, some
courts have found that increased risk of identity theft is sufficient for standing).
127. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling that
the plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft
of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data”).
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increased risk of future identify theft stemming from a stolen laptop from a
Starbucks coffee shop containing the names, social security numbers, and
addresses of nearly one hundred thousand employees in an unencrypted
file.128 The court again upheld the notion that when a data breach plaintiff
alleges that an act increased his risk of future harm by identity theft, this
constitutes an injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article
III.129
The recent circuit split was established in the December 2011 decision in
Reilly, when the Third Circuit broke from the decisions of its sister courts
in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and denied standing for data breach
victims based on the injury-in-fact requirement.130 In Reilly, law firm
employees brought a class action suit against a payroll-processing firm for
alleged negligence in a breach of confidential personal data.131 The Reilly
court held that when plaintiffs fail to allege that there is actual misuse of
the compromised data, there is neither a “concrete and particularized”
injury, nor a threat of harm that is “certainly impending.”132 Reilly ruled
that even expenditures made by victims to monitor credit information did
not confer standing, and that these costs, which were meant to ease the fear
of future third-party misuse of their information, are based on an injury that
is too “speculative” and “hypothetical.”133
To justify this holding, the Third Circuit went to great lengths to
distinguish data breach plaintiffs from plaintiffs in various other factual
scenarios where the law readily recognizes standing for an increased risk of
harm, or for the costs of prophylactic monitoring services to detect and
prevent future harm.134 Although the court’s vociferous refusal to
acknowledge plaintiff’s standing did not permit the case to proceed to the
merits, subsequent charges filed separately by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) belied the reality that Ceridian’s failure to secure its
customers’ personal and financial data had wrought serious harm requiring
a legal remedy.135 The FTC’s claim set out charges that Ceridian
128. Id. at 1140.
129. Id. at 1143.
130. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations of an
increased risk of identity theft as a result of the security breach are hypothetical, future
injuries, and are therefore insufficient to establish standing.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2395
(2012).
131. See id. at 40 (noting that 27,000 employees at 900 companies had personal and
financial information exposed).
132. See id. at 43, 46 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 595 n.2
(1992)); Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2007).
133. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 46.
134. See id. at 44–46 (seeking to distance data breach claims from toxic exposure, faulty
medical device, and environmental claims involving latent harm, asserting erroneously that
in data breach scenarios there is no actual quantifiable injury that occurs, and that because
human bodily health concerns are not implicated, standing should not be granted).
135. See FTC Settles Charges Against Two Companies That Allegedly Failed to Protect
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misrepresented the integrity of its security measures and failed to
adequately protect its network from “reasonably foreseeable attacks,”
enabling a hacker to breach one of Ceridian’s electronic payroll processing
applications and compromising the personal information of thousands of
customers.136 The FTC’s resulting Consent Agreement with Ceridian
mandated that the company refrain from misleading data security claims,
implement a comprehensive security program designed to better protect the
confidentiality and integrity of personal information collected by
consumers, and submit to biennial third-party security audits for a twentyyear period.137
On May 14, 2012 the Supreme Court denied plaintiff Reilly’s petition
for certiorari,138 delaying resolution of the circuit split, perhaps for the
purpose of allowing data breach litigation to achieve broader consideration
by the federal circuit courts. Indeed, since the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Reilly, this standing issue continues to percolate through the
courts, most recently reaching the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in Katz v. Pershing, LLC.139 In that case, the customer of a
financial data services company alleged a lack of adequate data security
protocols, placing the plaintiff at an increased risk of harm due to the loss
of her secure personal data.140 The court denied the plaintiff standing, but
noted the lack of an important common denominator with Pisciotta,
Krottner, and Reilly.141 In each of those cases the claims arose as a
consequence of the actual misappropriation of sensitive personal data by a
third party. In Katz, however, the plaintiff merely claimed a risk of future
harm due to a perceived weakness in data security, not that the security
deficiency had resulted in exposure to an unauthorized person.142 The court
held that the lack of an actual data breach was a “fatal” omission for the
standing analysis, suggesting that had a hacker actually misappropriated
her data she would have satisfied “Article III’s requirement of actual or
impending injury.”143 The Katz decision, while noting the “disarray”
among the circuit courts concerning standing on the basis of increased risk
in data breach cases, may indicate a movement toward the standard upheld
Sensitive Employee Data, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 3, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/
05/ceridianlookout.shtm (describing the charges against Ceridian for “fail[ure] to employ
reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect” large amounts of sensitive data
about its business customers in violation of federal law).
136. Id.
137. See Ceridian Corp., 151 F.T.C. 514, 520–23 (2011) (detailing the terms of the FTC
Consent Agreement).
138. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2395 (2012).
139. 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012).
140. Id. at 70.
141. Id. at 80.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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in Pisciotta and Krottner, and a repudiation of Reilly.144
II. DATA BREACH PLAINTIFFS SHOULD NOT BE TURNED AWAY AT THE
COURTHOUSE STEPS
A. The Supreme Court’s Standing Doctrine Permits Justiciability of Data
Breach Victims’ Claims
The original purpose of the constitutional standing requirement was to
ensure the separation of powers delineated by the Constitution.145 The
standing doctrine also encompasses several judicially self-imposed
prudential standing requirements to limit federal jurisdiction.146 These
include the “general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s
legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement
that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the
law invoked.”147
The standing requirement was also originally intended to ensure litigants
are persons likely to be most directly affected by a court’s ruling.148
Guided by this goal of the standing doctrine, the Court rejects claims that
are merely “a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned
bystanders.”149 Expounding on this rationale, the Court has said: “The
exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty,
and property of those to whom it extends, is therefore restricted to litigants
who can show ‘injury in fact’ resulting from the action which they seek to
have the court adjudicate.”150
Similarly, a fundamental purpose of the standing doctrine is to prevent
citizens from bringing suits predicated on abstract injuries such as
violations of generalized rights by government action.151 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly rejected claims of standing based on “the generalized
144. See id. (noting the outcomes in Reilly, Krottner, and Pisciotta).
145. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is
built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”).
146. Id. at 751.
147. Id.
148. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (explaining that to demonstrate standing a plaintiff
must show that he or she has “a direct stake in the controversy” and is not just a concerned
third party).
149. Id.
150. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
151. See id. at 482–83 (explaining the Court’s decision to reject claims of standing based
solely on the fact that citizens are generally unhappy with government action, and stating
that allowing citizens to have federal standing in these situations would mean “to employ a
federal court as a forum in which to air . . . generalized grievances about the conduct of
government” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968))).
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interest of all citizens.”152
Application of the standing doctrine to modern cybersecurity cases
reveals that denying standing to victims of data exposure does not even
remotely serve the original purposes of this justiciability requirement. This
survey of Supreme Court jurisprudence shows that the essence of the
Article III standing requirements boils down to ensuring cases have
concrete adversity that is capable of judicial resolution, avoiding questions
best answered by the political branches of government, and avoiding
citizen suits.153 None of these foundational concerns are at play in cases
like Pisciotta, Krottner, and Reilly. The actions individuals must take
following a breach of their personal information, such as buying identity
theft insurance, protecting their finances with credit-monitoring services,
replacing credit cards, and ordering new checks, are all concrete,
reasonable expenses, and economic losses resulting from the alleged
negligence of the data storage entity.154 It is therefore possible to restore
the victim’s losses by covering these costs. Thus, data breach cases easily
hurdle the requirement that a claim include a concrete adversity that is
redressable. Further, data breach cases involve neither political questions
nor taxpayers seeking to enforce statutes, and therefore they do not threaten
to violate the political question or “citizen suit” justiciability principles.
Courts that fail to permit standing in data security cases have strayed too
far from the Constitution’s Article III justiciability requirements and set the
threshold for injury-in-fact beyond what the Supreme Court’s standing
jurisprudence warrants, unjustly limiting plaintiffs’ access to the courts.155
Courts too often abuse the standing inquiry as an opportunity to avoid
ruling on the merits, prematurely dismissing cases on jurisdictional grounds
that they believe could not succeed on the merits.156 While it can be
difficult for plaintiffs to prove compensable damages in cybersecurity
cases,157 courts that doubt success on the merits but properly apply the
standing doctrine would permit standing, and only dismiss a claim after the
plaintiff has made his case.158 Data breach cases present factual questions
152. Id. at 483 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
217 (1974)).
153. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
154. These expenses are analogous to the expenditures made by plaintiffs in toxic
exposure and defective medical device cases discussed infra Part II.B.
155. See Elliott, supra note 62, at 467 (asserting that the way courts apply the standing
doctrine does not achieve the original goal of promoting separation of powers).
156. See id. at 466 (articulating the criticism that courts use the standing doctrine to
decide cases on the merits under the “guise of a threshold jurisdictional inquiry”).
157. See Rancourt, supra note 2, at 195 (describing how plaintiffs in data breach cases
frequently struggle to quantify monetary losses and how courts take divergent approaches to
the issue).
158. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2007)
(recognizing the plaintiffs’ ability to bring a claim for an increased risk of identity theft, but
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concerning the nature and quality of the defendant’s electronic security
measures, and assessments of quantifiable measures of risk faced by the
plaintiff; these questions are best resolved at trial and to do so they must
survive the jurisdictional standing inquiry.
B. Application of Analogous “Latent Harm” Tort Law Principles to
Standing in Data Breach Cases Compels a Finding of Article III Standing
The intractable split in the courts over standing in data security breaches
can be resolved by applying a line of cases finding injury-in-fact in
analogous situations where a defendant’s actions increased the plaintiff’s
risk of future harm. These cases show by analogy that the fact that a
plaintiff has suffered a breach of his or her data security, but has not
experienced actual identity theft, should not bar standing to sue. Applying
the principles upheld by courts in the cases below, courts should recognize
plaintiff standing for the harm of increased risk of identity theft.
The court in Pisciotta acknowledged standing for the plaintiff with only
modest support for doing so,159 while the Krottner court extended the
rationale for this holding with reference to courts that acknowledged an
injury-in-fact in a variety of factual contexts.160 Reilly by contrast, offers
an extended yet flawed analysis in which the court endeavors to distinguish
data breaches from all fact patterns in which courts recognize a present
injury for a credible threat of future harm.161 The Reilly court’s two
principle assertions—that in data breach cases no actual injury (or
quantifiable risk of future harm) is present, and that standing for future
injury must hinge on human bodily health concerns—are unpersuasive and
contradict controlling tort principles.162
1.

Toxic exposure
In toxic exposure cases, a plaintiff who has no current symptoms of a
particular disease, but has reason to believe that he or she will become
symptomatic with that disease at some point in the future as a direct result
of a toxic environmental exposure, may bring a claim for damages to pay

dismissing the case on the merits for their inability to prove compensable damages).
159. See id. at 634 & nn.3–4 (citing authority in the footnotes without further
explanation).
160. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting
briefly how several courts have granted standing for future injury in environmental and
medical-monitoring claims).
161. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45–46 (3d Cir. 2011) (attempting to
distinguish claims of latent harm, including environmental harm, toxic exposure, and
defective medical device cases), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2395 (2012).
162. See id. at 45 (distinguishing an injury suffered from a data breach from one suffered
in a medical or environmental case because there is “no change in the status quo” and it
does not implicate “human health concerns”).
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for preventative medical-monitoring care. For example, in In re “Agent
Orange” Product Liability Litigation,163 the court rejected the argument
that “injury in fact means injury that is manifest, diagnosable or
compensable.”164 There, Vietnam War veterans brought a toxic exposure
claim against companies that manufactured the chemical defoliant Agent
Orange.165 Although many of the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who
were exposed to the toxic chemical in the course of their service fell ill as a
consequence of exposure, this class action was brought, in part, on behalf
of “those individual veterans manifesting no symptoms of illness and
disease at present, but at risk of genetic and somatic damage.”166 In other
words, the suit was brought on behalf of those soldiers who had been
exposed to the chemical but did not show outward signs of illness. The
court in this case ruled that the “injury” to the asymptomatic plaintiffs
occurred by their “at risk” status due to the chemical exposure.167 The
increased risk of future harm was effectively a present injury.168
This principle of increased risk as the foundation for a claim is directly
applicable to plaintiffs like those in Reilly, Pisciotta, and Krottner, who
have been subjected to a heightened risk of harm by the actions of the
defendants who failed to properly secure their data. The defendant’s
argument in Reilly that the plaintiffs merely alleged a speculative or
conjectural harm is the same made by the defendant chemical company in
“Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation.169 This argument also
wrongfully ignores the plaintiffs’ heightened “at risk” status and should
similarly be discarded.
163. 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Syngenta Crop
Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
164. Id. at 1434 (internal quotation marks omitted). In a notable 1997 toxic exposure
case, however, the Supreme Court indicated that there are limits to the damages plaintiffs
may recover when they are exposed to a toxic substance but remain asymptomatic. MetroNorth Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997). In Metro-North, a railroad
employee brought an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C.
§ 51, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress in connection with his exposure to
asbestos. 521 U.S. at 427. Although much of the Court’s analysis addressed whether
exposure to asbestos dust constitutes a “physical impact” sufficient to support an emotional
distress claim, the court also considered the bounds of tort liability for medical-monitoring
costs. Id. at 438–44. The Court held that although plaintiffs have a recognized tort law
cause of action to recover for medical-monitoring costs, this liability is not unqualified, and
may be limited in a claim under FELA. Id. at 444.
165. See “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d at 1428 (summarizing the
protracted background of the litigation).
166. Id. at 1428, 1433 (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. at 1434.
168. Id. at 1433–34.
169. Compare Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44–45 (3d Cir. 2011) (labeling
the plaintiffs’ increased risk of injury too speculative and hypothetical), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 2395 (2012), with “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d at 1434 (finding
plaintiffs’ risk of future harm due to chemical exposure sufficient injury to pursue a
claim).
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A similar analysis has been upheld in a variety of other toxic exposure
scenarios, all of which exhibit a close analogy to the latent harm in the risk
of identity theft. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc.,170 the Supreme Court upheld standing for plaintiffs opposing
the construction of a nuclear power plant near their homes.171 The
plaintiffs had not yet suffered any physical injury as a result of exposure to
nuclear emissions—their claim was instead based on the mere possibility
that they may be exposed to nuclear contamination in the future and that
they would be subject to the “present fear and apprehension” regarding
proximity of the plant.172
The reasoning in Duke Power mirrors the reasoning necessary to support
standing for plaintiffs in data breach cases. Just as the plaintiffs in Duke
Power had not suffered the actual toxicity of the power plant,173 the victims
in Reilly had not suffered actual identity theft, yet were still put at an
increased risk of harm.174 Further, the “present fear and apprehension” that
supported a finding of standing in Duke Power is also relevant in that
victims of data exposure may reasonably suffer fear and anxiety that severe
consequences may result from identity theft, such as damaged credit and
future inability to obtain a loan, and insecurity of financial accounts.175
The Third Circuit’s analysis in Reilly overlooks the fact that the present
distress and fear a person suffers in anticipation of a future harm is a
cognizable injury for standing purposes.176
The Third Circuit considered medical monitoring in In re Paoli Railroad
Yard PCB Litigation,177 holding that a cause of action for medical
monitoring is cognizable in order to cover the cost of periodic medical
examinations.178 Like in the toxic exposure cases above, these medical
evaluations were necessary to detect and prevent potentially latent diseases
as a result of exposure to hazardous substances, in this case, toxic
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).179 The court outlined the difference
170. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
171. Id. at 67, 81.
172. Id. at 73.
173. See id. at 72–73 (characterizing the power plants as only “potentially dangerous” to
the plaintiffs, putting them at a risk of future injury).
174. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40 (noting the plaintiffs’ allegations of an increased risk of
future identity theft).
175. Joshua R. Levenson, Strength in Numbers: An Examination into the Liability of
Corporate Entities for Consumer and Employee Data Breaches, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 95, 112–13 (2008) (noting that financial losses due to identity theft affect victims in
different ways including credit card disruptions, damaged credit ratings, harassment by debt
collectors, rejected applications for loans and insurance, and other issues).
176. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
177. 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990).
178. See id. at 852 (interpreting Pennsylvania law and speculating that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania would recognize such a cause of action).
179. See id. at 835–36 (delineating the plaintiffs’ claims of exposure to abnormally high
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between medical-monitoring claims and damages claims involving an
increased risk of harm without a present physical injury.180
The Third Circuit in Paoli considered medical monitoring a tort in and of
itself, as opposed to a remedy for the underlying tort of exposure to an
increased risk of future harm.181 The court contrasted a claim for medical
monitoring to a claim for damages based on the enhanced risk, stating: “an
action for medical monitoring seeks to recover only the quantifiable costs
of periodic medical examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical
harm, whereas an enhanced risk claim seeks compensation for the
anticipated harm itself, proportionately reduced to reflect the chance that it
will not occur.”182
This rationale is useful in an analysis of plaintiff standing in data security
cases as well. Just as the costs of medical monitoring are independent of
the potential future illness, credit-monitoring costs are distinguishable from
whatever harm may occur in the future as a result of identity theft.183 Such
present, immediate costs must reasonably be considered concrete and
particularized injuries worthy at least of standing, if not as compensable
damages.
Although the Reilly court cites Paoli for ostensible support,184 the Paoli
decision in fact undermines the Reilly court’s claim that standing should
not be granted where outward injury is not present but looms in the future.
The court in Paoli explained that people suffering only an “increased risk”
of cell damage—not actual cell damage—have a present cause of action,185
just as data breach plaintiffs suffer an increased risk of future injury. In
either case, notwithstanding greater harm that may result in the future,
when a defendant creates a risk of harm requiring monitoring costs,
whether they are medical or financial costs, the damage has been done.
2.

Defective medical devices
Injury-in-fact is also found, and medical-monitoring costs awarded, in

levels of PCB and resulting harm).
180. See id. at 850 (asserting that actions for medical monitoring seek to recover
merely the costs of medical examinations necessary to detect the presence of physical
harm, “whereas an enhanced risk claim seeks compensation for the anticipated harm
itself”).
181. Id. at 850–51.
182. Id. at 849–51.
183. Id. at 850; see also Johnson, supra note 36, at 122 (exploring the similarities
between medical monitoring and credit monitoring).
184. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing In re Paoli, 916
F.2d at 851–52) (asserting that in toxic torts the damage has been done once contamination
occurs and not once contamination causes illness), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2395 (2012).
185. See In re Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852 (emphasizing that a plaintiff must suffer a
“significantly increased risk” of serious disease as the result exposure to toxic materials and
it is this “increased risk [that] makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably
necessary”).
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cases where there is prospective harm in the potential failure of a defective
medical device. In a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case,
Sutton v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc.,186 a class of plaintiffs who were
implanted with a potentially faulty medical device during cardiac bypass
surgery sued the hospital and device creator.187 The plaintiffs’ claim
sought the imposition of a medical-monitoring fund for the patients who
were put at an increased risk of health complications as a consequence of
the defendant’s actions.188 This fund would cover the costs of tests and
medical evaluations with the purpose of preventing future harm and
discovering injury that may manifest itself in the future.189 The court
observed that tort plaintiffs have increasingly been awarded medicalmonitoring costs in both toxic tort and product liability cases.190 The court
acknowledged standing under Article III and reasoned that medicalmonitoring awards aid currently healthy plaintiffs who have been exposed
to an increased risk of future harm to detect and treat any resulting harm at
an early stage.191 Further, the court rejected the notion that the
“immediacy” of injury is necessarily required for standing—latent harm
will suffice.192 The court held that whether the plaintiff was likely to
succeed on the merits was “not a proper consideration” in an inquiry about
standing.193 The holding in Sutton that plaintiffs who are at an increased
risk of future harm and are subject to attendant monitoring costs have
Article III standing to sue is a relatively recent but broadly accepted
principle of law.194
The remedy of medical-monitoring costs perfectly parallels the costs
incurred by plaintiffs in data breach cases for credit-monitoring costs: like
periodic tests to evaluate the health of their body, credit monitoring serves
186. 419 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2005).
187. Id. at 569.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 569–70.
190. See id. at 571 (citing Arvin Maskin et al., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy
for Deserving Plaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 521, 522 (2000)).
191. Id. at 571.
192. Id. at 572. The court noted that in a previous case where medical monitoring was
awarded, the monitoring was immediately necessary to prevent irreparable harm. Id. (citing
Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). In
Sutton, however, it concluded that immediacy was not required. Id.
193. Id. at 574.
194. See id. at 571–75 (citing a multitude of defective medical device and product
liability cases, e.g., Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003); Willett v. Baxter
Int’l, Inc., 929 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1991); Taylor v. Medtronics, Inc., 861 F.2d 980 (6th Cir.
1988); Harris v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 218 F.R.D. 590, 595 (S.D. Ohio 2003)); see also
Adam P. Joffee, Comment, The Medical Monitoring Remedy: Ongoing Controversy and a
Proposed Solution, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 663, 664 (2009) (observing that the American
Law Institute (ALI) is set to endorse medical-monitoring awards in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts).
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to ensure the financial health of the plaintiffs.195 Moreover, the court in
Sutton stated that “there is something to be said for disease prevention, as
opposed to disease treatment,” opining that it was “both overly harsh and
economically inefficient” to offer redress only after a plaintiff has
experienced physical injury.196 Prophylactic measures of credit monitoring
to prevent financial harm to data breach plaintiffs will certainly reap
benefits in the same way and will prevent larger economic losses.197
However, the court’s holding in Reilly effectively forces plaintiffs to
wait until their bank accounts have been raided and they have suffered the
full consequences of identity theft to sue, instead of granting the plaintiffs
the opportunity to seek available preventative measures.198 The impact of
following this path and failing to employ protective measures could be
ruinous to a data breach victim’s financial and emotional wellbeing.199 One
of the Reilly court’s failures is its characterization of data breach plaintiffs’
preventative credit-monitoring expenditures as “willingly incurred
costs.”200 On the contrary, victims of data loss who spend resources to
ensure the security of their finances do so prudently as a necessary measure
to attenuate their increased vulnerability to fraud.201 The expenses must be
considered a real, present, and particularized injury sufficient for standing.
3.

Environmental harm
The parallels between the risk of harm data breach plaintiffs face and the
injury to plaintiffs in environmental harm cases is equally strong. In the
Ninth Circuit environmental case Central Delta Water Agency v. United
States,202 the court recognized latent harm as a possible basis for a claim.203
The court acknowledged that determining jurisdictional standing in the case
required consideration of when a party may sue to prevent a future injury
that it believes another’s actions will cause.204 The claim in Delta Water

195. There are many credit-monitoring services available to the general public. See, e.g.,
Credit
Monitoring,
EXPERIAN,
http://www.experian.com/consumer-products/creditmonitoring.html (last visited June 15, 2013).
196. Sutton, 419 F.3d at 575 (emphasis omitted).
197. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 113 (explaining that preventative measures can
ensure against financial ruin and the inability to get credit or obtain employment).
198. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying standing
based on credit-monitoring expenses), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2395 (2012).
199. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 137 (referencing emotional distress, in addition to
financial trouble, as a consequence of personal data exposure).
200. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 46.
201. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 113 (describing how credit monitoring allows the
victims of a data breach to take immediate measures in order to “avoid financial ruin”).
202. 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2002).
203. See id. at 950 (explaining that “plaintiffs need not wait until the natural resources
are despoiled before challenging the government action leading to the potential
destruction”).
204. Id. at 943.
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was brought by California farmers against the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
challenging a plan to release water from a reservoir into a river in
California’s Central Valley to comply with fish habitat restoration
requirements.205 The claim alleged that this release would create a
substantial risk that the farmers’ crops would not survive.206 The plaintiffs
claimed that the high salinity of the water would diminish their ability to
grow crops because they used the water to irrigate their fields.207 However,
the plaintiffs had only been threatened with this injury, no crop loss had yet
occurred.208 The court held that plaintiffs need not establish that they in
fact have standing, but only that there is a genuine question of material fact
as to the standing elements, and further found that the plaintiffs had at the
very least raised a material question of fact with respect to the issue of
whether they suffer a substantial risk of harm as a result of the Bureau’s
policies.209 Therefore, the court held that the alleged risk was sufficient to
confer standing.210
Applied to data breach cases, such as Reilly, Pisciotta, and Krottner, this
standard shows it is improper for a court to issue a dismissal for lack of
standing when the judge must make a determination whether the future risk
is great enough to amount to injury-in-fact. Because such inquiries in data
breach cases are so factually driven—requiring an assessment of the
adequacy of data security in place and the level of risk faced by the data
breach victim211—dismissal for lack of standing cannot be appropriate
where a plaintiff alleges a future threat of identity theft.
The Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans212 decision similarly supports
the environmental claim analogy to data breach claims. There, municipal
officials sued to prevent the Corps of Engineers from issuing a permit to
construct a radio tower in a floodplain near the village.213 The Seventh
Circuit found standing because the village was in the path of a potential
flood and “even a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or
controversy.”214 This proposition—that even a small chance of harm that is

205. Id. at 945–46 (describing how the claims arose following passage of the Central
Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992)).
206. Id. at 947.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 947, 950 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 104,
118 (1998)) (noting that the plaintiffs need only show that the facts alleged, if proved,
would confer standing).
210. Id. at 950.
211. See, e.g., McLoughlin v. People’s United Bank, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00944, 2009 WL
2843269, at *1, *3, *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2009) (noting that in a comparable Maine statute,
the court required ascertainable loss of personal data to ensure that the alleged is palpable).
212. 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1993).
213. Id. at 328.
214. Id. at 329.
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remediable by the court is injury-in-fact sufficient for standing—
undermines the ruling in Reilly that the threat of identity theft is too
“conjectural” and “hypothetical.”215 Applying the analysis employed in
Evans, the inherent threat of harm to an individual who suffers the
exposure of sensitive personal data exceeds this requirement, especially
since the harm incident to identity theft can be mitigated.216
Other environmental cases support the same conclusion as well. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Mountain
States Legal Foundation v. Glickman217 held that an increased risk of
wildfire as the result of certain logging practices constitutes injury-infact.218 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club,
Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co.219 granted standing to
environmentalists who anticipated the future pollution of a bay and did not
require evidence of actual harm to a waterway, noting “[t]hat this injury is
couched in terms of future impairment rather than past impairment is of no
moment.”220
Finally, in another key case involving future risk of waterway pollution,
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.,221 an
environmental advocacy group brought an action to prevent environmental
damage.222 Like the plaintiffs in data breach cases, the plaintiffs in Friends
of the Earth, Inc. alleged an increased risk of future harm.223 Ruling on the
standing issue, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ reasonable fear and
215. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2395 (2012).
216. See, e.g., James Graves, Comment, “Medical” Monitoring for Non-Medical Harms:
Evaluating the Reasonable Necessity of Measures to Avoid Identity Fraud After a Data Breach, 16
RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 1, 2009, at 48–49, http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v16i1/article2.pdf (noting that
credit-monitoring services frequently include identity theft insurance which will compensate victims
for the costs of responding to identity theft); see also Elisabeth Goodridge, Steps To Prevent
Identity Theft, and What To Do if It Happens, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/02/your-money/identity-theft/02Id
theftprimer.html?pagewanted=all (suggesting that identity theft insurance can reassure those
who have fallen victim to identify theft); Lynnette Khalfani-Cox, Why Critics Are Wrong
FIN.
(June
14,
2010),
About
Credit
Monitoring
Services,
DAILY
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/06/14/why-critics-are-wrong-about-credit
-monitoring-services/ (asserting that even if credit monitoring does not prevent identity
theft, it helps detect and deter fraudulent activity to minimize damage).
217. 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
218. See id. at 1234–35 (explaining that an “incremental risk is enough of a threat of
injury” to allow plaintiff standing).
219. 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996).
220. Id. at 556.
221. 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
222. See id. at 150 (detailing the plaintiffs’ claims that the pollution adversely affects
how they use the lake allegedly polluted by the defendants, such as by limiting the time
spent swimming in it, causing them to limit the amount of fish they eat caught from the lake,
and a hesitation to scuba dive in it because of the contamination).
223. See id. at 153, 156 (noting the potential for heavy metals and chemical pollution in
local waterways).
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concern about the potential effects of the polluting discharge, supported by
objective evidence, directly affected the plaintiffs “recreational and
economic interests” and that this type of “impact constitutes injury in
fact.”224
Evaluating claims by data breach victims in light of this line of “latent
harm” environmental cases illustrates a willingness in courts to permit
plaintiffs to sustain a claim for an increased risk of future harm. The
rationale in these cases logically supports the notion that standing must be
upheld in data breach cases and mutes arguments to the contrary.
C. The Economic Loss Rule Should Not Bar Recovery of Damages in
Data Security Claims and Is Irrelevant to the Standing Analysis
The economic loss doctrine, also known as the economic loss rule, is a
tort principle requiring courts to distinguish damages that are characterized
as economic loss from non-economic damages.225 Courts may consider the
economic loss rule as a potential bar for plaintiffs seeking recovery for
negligent loss of their secure personal information.226 Under this doctrine,
damages for non-economic losses are recoverable through tort law, while
damages deemed to be purely economic loss, when not also involving
personal injury or property damage, are recoverable only through contract
law.227 There is little consensus among the courts, however, on how these
distinctions properly apply, and the rule is subject to myriad exceptions
where certain purely economic damages are actionable in tort.228
Exceptions permitting recovery of pure economic loss include negligent
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, professional malpractice,
nuisance, and defamation.229

224. Id. at 161.
225. See Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic
Loss from Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1081–82 (2008) (explaining that
the distinction is important because economic damages can only be recovered through
contract law but non-economic damages can be recovered under tort law).
226. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App’x 129, 132 (9th Cir. 2010) (raising the
economic loss rule as a potential bar but declining to rule on the issue); see also Paul v.
Providence Health Sys.-Or., 240 P.3d 1110, 1116 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (ruling that data
breach victims could not recover pure economic damages for expenses incurred by
purchasing credit-monitoring services), aff’d, 273 P.3d 106 (Or. 2012).
227. See Anzivino, supra note 225, at 1081 (explaining that, under the economic loss
doctrine, in most states a case may only advance as a contract case or a tort case, but not
both); see also Kathryn E. Picanso, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data
Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 381 (2006) (“[M]any jurisdictions do
not allow plaintiffs to recover for economic losses absent any physical injury, under the
economic loss doctrine.”).
228. Anzivino, supra note 225, at 1081.
229. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 122 (discussing the “multitude of well-recognized
exceptions” to the economic loss rule).
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The intent of the economic loss doctrine is to encourage parties to
regulate their economic relationships through contract law, by “limiting a
plaintiff to contractual remedies for loss of the benefit of the bargain.”230
However, a number of data security laws provide that a waiver of an
individual’s rights in data security is contrary to public policy, and
therefore void and unenforceable, meaning corporations and individuals are
limited in their ability to contract around data security obligations.231
Further, it is not practical for individual consumers and employees to
bargain over data security contract provisions with each of the large
corporations that collect and maintain their secure information in so many
aspects of their lives.232 Because the law frequently limits consumers’
ability to enter contractual relationships with organizations concerning their
data security rights, and because it is not practical for them to do so, it
would be nonsensical for the economic loss rule to bar plaintiffs’ claims of
damages for exposure of sensitive electronic data. Establishing that the
economic loss rule is not applicable to data breach claims may increase
plaintiffs’ likelihood of recovering monetary damages such as creditmonitoring costs.
It is nonetheless crucial to distinguish between the burden of proof
plaintiffs must meet to recover damages at trial, from the lower burden of
proving injury-in-fact to achieve standing.233 Courts that improperly
conflate injury (for standing purposes) and damages risk prematurely
dismissing a claim on jurisdictional grounds that should have gone to
trial.234 The court in Krottner correctly observed that the jurisdictional
standing requirements of federal courts are distinguishable from state-law
issues related to tort damages.235 This suggests that whether a plaintiff can
recover damages for an increased risk of harm under state law is not
germane to whether a plaintiff has standing to assert a claim for an
increased risk of identity theft.236 Courts that deny standing in data breach
cases frequently rely too heavily on an estimation of plaintiffs’ ability to
230. Id. at 122 n.59 (quoting Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P’ship v. Design Alliance,
Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 671 (Ariz. 2010)).
231. See Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 300 (2005).
232. Id. at 300–01 (arguing that it is “simply unrealistic” to expect passive consumers to
bargain with large companies due to an individuals’ lack of commercial leverage).
233. Johnson, supra note 36, at 143–44 (highlighting the importance of this distinction
because standing is a federal issue, whereas proof of damages implicates state tort law,
meaning precedent established by federal courts should not serve as a guide to deciding
what is essentially a state-law issue).
234. See Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663–64 (1977) (arguing that standing has become a surrogate for a
full decision on the merits).
235. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App’x 129, 131 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissing
the state-law claims).
236. Id.
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recover damages, improperly employing the jurisdictional standing inquiry
to address the merits of the plaintiffs’ tort claims.237 A plaintiff’s relative
likelihood of proving compensable damages, whether probable or
improbable, should not bear on the determination of whether that plaintiff
has standing to sue.238
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs whose privacy and financial security are put at an elevated risk
by the actions of another should not be turned away at the courthouse steps.
When a person’s sensitive digital data is compromised, the risk of future
identity theft and the costs and emotional distress that ensue constitute an
immediate harm worthy of justiciability. The Reilly court’s analysis of
Article III standing was flawed, and far too narrow, because it refused to
acknowledge injury-in-fact for victims of data security breaches. The rule
accepted by the Pisciotta and Krottner courts, which confers standing for
plaintiffs in data breach cases, should control the analysis because the
latent harm in defective medical device, toxic substance exposure, and
environmental injury cases is analogous to the latent harm inherent in a
heightened risk of future identity theft. These cases show that the risk of
identity theft is not only a cognizable injury, but it is one that is remediable
through injunctive relief in the form of credit-monitoring and identity theft
security services. The circuit split created by the Third Circuit in Reilly
should be resolved by adopting the decisions of the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits to recognize injury-in-fact for plaintiff standing.
Permitting standing for increased risk of identity theft will bring this
developing area of cybersecurity law in line with the Supreme Court’s
original intent of the standing doctrine, and it may help slow the escalating
rate at which severe electronic security breaches occur by creating an
incentive for corporations to meet the most rigorous security protocols
possible to protect the privacy of their employees’ and customers’ personal
information. Victims of data security breaches suffer a wide variety of
immediate harms including the costs of protecting their identity, the hassle,
emotional distress, and fear of being vulnerable to fraud, as well as the
increased risk of future theft. These harms are very real and remediable,
and when alleged by a plaintiff, should give courts little need to pause over
a standing inquiry. And although data breach victims may fail to recover
damages at trial, a jurisdictional standing inquiry should never serve as a
237. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 638 (7th Cir. 2007) (suggesting that
a separate inquiry into a plaintiff’s standing to bring a claim for increased risk of identity theft
is necessary, even if the court later dismisses the case on the merits for inability to prove
compensable damages for credit-monitoring costs).
238. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
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court’s opportunity to prematurely rule on the merits. Data security
plaintiffs, whether they ultimately are awarded relief or not, deserve their
day in court.

